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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE
To determine changes in household purchases 
of drinks and confectionery one year after 
implementation of the UK soft drinks industry levy 
(SDIL).
DESIGN
Controlled interrupted time series analysis.
PARTICIPANTS
Members of a panel of households reporting their 
purchasing on a weekly basis to a market research 
company (average weekly number of participants 
n=22 183), March 2014 to March 2019.
INTERVENTION
A two tiered tax levied on manufacturers of soft drinks, 
announced in March 2016 and implemented in April 
2018. Drinks with ≥8 g sugar/100 mL (high tier) are 
taxed at £0.24/L and drinks with ≥5 to <8 g sugar/100 
mL (low tier) are taxed at £0.18/L. Drinks with <5 g 
sugar/100 mL (no levy) are not taxed.
MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES
Absolute and relative differences in the volume of, 
and amount of sugar in, soft drinks categories, all 
soft drinks combined, alcohol, and confectionery 
purchased per household per week one year after 
implementation of the SDIL compared with trends 
before the announcement of the SDIL.
RESULTS
In March 2019, compared with the counterfactual 
estimated from pre-announcement trends, purchased 
volume of drinks in the high levy tier decreased by 
155 mL (95% confidence interval 240.5 to 69.5 mL) 
per household per week, equivalent to 44.3% (95% 
confidence interval 59.9% to 28.7%), and sugar 
purchased in these drinks decreased by 18.0 g (95% 
confidence interval 32.3 to 3.6 g), or 45.9% (68.8% 
to 22.9%). Purchases of low tier drinks decreased 
by 177.3 mL (225.3 to 129.3 mL) per household per 
week, or 85.9% (95.1% to 76.7%), with a 12.5 g (15.4 
to 9.5 g) reduction in sugar in these drinks, equivalent 
to 86.2% (94.2% to 78.1%). Despite no overall 
change in volume of no levy drinks purchased, there 
was an increase in sugar purchased of 15.3 g (12.6 
to 17.9 g) per household per week, equivalent to 
166.4% (94.2% to 238.5%). When all soft drinks were 
combined, the volume of drinks purchased did not 
change, but sugar decreased by 29.5 g (55.8 to 3.1 g), 
or 9.8% (17.9% to 1.8%). Purchases of confectionery 
and alcoholic drinks did not change.
CONCLUSIONS
Compared with trends before the SDIL was announced, 
one year after implementation, the volume of soft 
drinks purchased did not change. The amount of sugar 
in those drinks was 30 g, or 10%, lower per household 
per week—equivalent to one 250 mL serving of a low 
tier drink per person per week. The SDIL might benefit 




High consumption of sugar sweetened beverages 
(SSBs) is associated with increased risk of dental 
caries, obesity, type 2 diabetes, and cardiovascular 
disease.1-3 The World Health Organization recommends 
the use of SSB taxes to reduce consumption.4 A 
systematic review of studies published to June 2018 
suggests that SSB taxes lead to decreases in the sales, 
purchasing, and consumption of taxed drinks.5 More 
recent findings support this conclusion.6-10 Although 
price is one important mediator of these changes,11-16 
other potential mechanisms include reformulation 
of products to reduce sugar concentration, smaller 
portion sizes, and increases in the perception of SSBs 
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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
High consumption of sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs) is associated with 
increased risk of dental caries, obesity, type 2 diabetes, and cardiovascular 
disease; the World Health Organization recommends the implementation of SSB 
taxes to reduce consumption
The UK soft drinks industry levy (SDIL) was designed to encourage reformulation 
of soft drinks to remove sugar via three design features: a levy on manufacturers; 
inclusion of two tiers, with a higher rate charged on drinks with more sugar; 
and announcement of the levy two years before implementation to give 
manufacturers time to adjust
Although previous evaluations have explored the effect of consumer facing SSB 
taxes, none have explored the effect of the SDIL on purchases, taking existing 
trends in purchases into account
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
Overall one year after implementation, compared with pre-announcement 
trends, the total volume of all soft drinks purchased did not change but the sugar 
purchased in these drinks decreased by 30 g per household per week, or 9.8%—
equivalent to three fewer teaspoons, or one 250 mL serving of a drink with 5 g 
sugar per 100 mL per person per week
No change in total volume purchased but decreases in sugar in drinks purchased 
means that tiered SSB taxes such as the SDIL might benefit public health without 
harming the soft drinks industry
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being harmful to health associated with them being 
grouped with other taxed products such as alcohol 
and tobacco.17 Furthermore, any public health benefits 
of reduced SSB consumption associated with SSB 
taxes might be negated by increased consumption of 
substitutes such as confectionery and alcohol.18-20
The UK soft drinks industry levy (SDIL) was one of 
the first taxes on SSBs explicitly designed to incentivise 
manufacturers of SSBs to reduce sugar content.21 22 This 
is reflected in three design features. Firstly, the SDIL 
is levied on manufacturers, importers, and bottlers 
rather than on consumers. Secondly, the levy includes 
two tiers: £0.24/L for drinks containing ≥8 g total 
sugar per 100 mL, and £0.18/L for drinks containing 
≥5 g and <8 g total sugar per 100 mL. Thirdly, the SDIL 
was intentionally announced in 2016, two years before 
implementation in 2018, to allow manufacturers time 
to adjust. The SDIL also provides exemptions (see 
box 1).23
Two before and after analyses have shown 
reductions of around 30% in sales weighted sugar 
concentration of levy eligible drinks in the UK from 
before the announcement of the SDIL on 16 March 
2016 to after implementation on 6 April 2018.24 25 
However, background trends in purchases of sugary 
drinks are not stable, with decreases reported over 
several years.26 This makes it difficult to attribute 
before and after decreases in sugary drinks purchases 
to the SDIL. An interrupted time series analysis found 
that the announcement and implementation of the 
SDIL were together associated with a 34 percentage 
point reduction in the proportion of levy liable drinks 
with >5 g total sugar per 100 mL, indicating substantial 
reformulation of the market.16 Changes in prices 
across the UK soft drink market were also reported, 
although it was difficult to discern clear patterns in 
these, with some levied categories increasing and 
others decreasing in price. In a controlled interrupted 
time series analysis including data up to the point of 
implementation of the SDIL, we found that the SDIL 
announcement was associated with changes in both 
the volume of, and sugar purchased in, drinks in many 
categories.27 However, we found no overall change in 
total volume of, or sugar purchased in, all soft drinks 
combined.
We determined whether household purchases of 
drinks and confectionery had changed one year after 
implementation of the SDIL.
Methods
Here we extend our previous analyses27 to study 
changes in the volume of, and amount of sugar 
in, household purchases of drinks in each levy 
tier, exempt drinks categories (including alcoholic 
drinks), and confectionery from two years before 
the announcement of the SDIL to one year after its 
implementation (March 2014 to March 2019). As 
before, we used controlled interrupted time series 
methods, with toiletries included as a control 
category.27 We compared observed changes associated 
with the announcement and implementation of the 
SDIL to the counterfactual scenarios in which the 
announcement and implementation did not take 
place. Including a full two years of data before the 
announcement enables us to estimate pre-intervention 
trends and project these forward as counterfactual 
scenarios. The protocol is published elsewhere28 
and the study was registered. This study is reported 
in accordance with the strengthening the reporting 
of observational studies in epidemiology (STROBE) 
guideline (see supplementary material A).
Data source
We used data from a panel of households reporting 
their purchasing on a weekly basis to a market research 
company (Kantar Worldpanel; KWP). Participating 
households are asked to record all food and drink 
purchases brought into the home (including those 
ordered online and delivered) through barcodes 
scanners and manual report. Purchasing information 
is uploaded weekly, where it is linked to nutritional 
data collected by KWP field workers on a rolling basis. 
Households record their personal characteristics every 
four weeks and receive gift vouchers worth about 
£100 ($122; €112) annually—equivalent to 0.3% of 
median UK annual household income after tax in 2019 
(£29 600).29
KWP samples households from across Great Britain 
using proprietary methods. It excludes households 
that record fewer than six purchases weekly along 
with those whose adjusted weekly spend is lower than 
an undisclosed minimum. KWP applies weights to 
purchases to adjust for these exclusions and maintain 
the representativeness of the panel. We used these 
weights throughout.
The main data cleaning that occurred before analysis 
involved assigning products and product groups in the 
Box 1: Glossary of terms
Soft drinks industry levy (SDIL)—a tiered tax on manufacturers of sugar sweetened 
beverages
Levy exempt drinks—drinks exempt from the SDIL irrespective of sugar content; that 
is, drinks containing >75% milk, drinks containing >1.2% alcohol, and drinks sold as 
alcohol replacements, drinks sold as powders, 100% fruit juices, and drinks sold by 
manufacturers selling less than one million litres of drinks not exempt for other reasons 
each year
High tier drinks—drinks that are not levy exempt and contain ≥8 g of sugar per 100 mL
Low tier drinks—drinks that are not levy exempt and contain ≥5 g to <8 g of sugar per 
100 mL
No levy drinks—drinks that are not levy exempt but contain <5 g of sugar per 100 mL; we 
subdivided this category into drinks containing >0 g to <5 g of sugar per 100 mL, drinks 
containing 0 g of sugar per 100 mL, and bottled water
Levy liable drinks—drinks that are not levy exempt drinks; that is, the sum of high tier 
drinks, low tier drinks, and no levy drinks
Soft drinks—any drink not containing alcohol
Confectionery—products in the sugar confectionery and chocolate confectionery 
categories
Toiletries—products in the shampoo, hair conditioner, and liquid soap categories.
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KWP dataset to SDIL relevant groups. This was done 
based on KWP assigned product groups, product 
names, and nutritional content. In previous work 
we found some evidence of error, but not bias, in the 
sugar concentration reported by KWP compared with 
information provided on manufacturers’ websites.27
Product categories: drinks, confectionery, and 
toiletries
Purchased drinks that were levy liable were divided 
into high tier, low tier, or no levy based on sugar 
content (see box 1 for definitions). No levy drinks were 
additionally disaggregated, as described in box 1.
As the SDIL might have led to substitution to other 
drinks categories, we also examined purchasing of levy 
exempt drinks in several categories: milk based drinks 
(comprising milk, milk alternatives such as soya drinks, 
and yoghurt based juices and drinks), alcoholic drinks 
(comprising both alcoholic and alcohol replacement 
drinks), no added sugar fruit juices, and drinks sold as 
powder (eg, tea, coffee, hot chocolate). Other exempt 
categories (infant formulas and drinks sold for medical 
purposes) were excluded.
We also hypothesised that the SDIL might lead to 
substitution from sugary drinks to other high sugar 
categories. To investigate this, we used sugar and 
chocolate confectionery purchases (referred to as 
confectionery).
Control group
To control for background trends in household purcha-
ses we used purchases of shampoo, hair conditioner, and 
liquid soap (ie, toiletries). Toiletries meet the proposed 
criteria for a controlled interrupted time series: they are 
robust to seasonality and probably have similar purch-
ase volumes by households regardless of socioeconomic 
position or other potential confounders.30
Outcome measures
Most evaluations of SSB taxes focus on volume of 
drinks purchased. However, the SDIL’s focus on 
reformulation makes the sugar purchased in drinks of 
additional public health interest. Thus, the outcome 
measures of interest were mean volume purchased per 
household per week in each of the drink categories and 
grams per household per week of confectionery; and 
mean sugar purchased per household per week from 
each of the drink categories and confectionery. Data 
were aggregated at the weekly level and analysed as a 
time series.
Overall analysis strategy
Previous evidence indicates that reformulation 
occurred after the announcement of the SDIL and 
price changes after implementation.16 As such, 
we hypothesised the SDIL might act as two linked 
interventions: the announcement on 16 March 2016 
and implementation on 6 April 2018.17 Thus, our 
analysis strategy involved three separate comparisons 
that isolate the announcement and implementation 
of the SDIL and then examine the combined effect (fig 
1). In the first analysis we isolated the announcement 
of the SDIL. Here we compared anticipatory effects on 
purchasing in the two years after the announcement to 
the counterfactual estimated from purchasing in the 
two years before the announcement. This replicates 
our previous analysis27 and is presented here for 
completeness. In the second analysis, we isolated 
the implementation of the SDIL. Here we compared 
purchasing in the year after implementation to the 
counterfactual estimated from purchasing in the two 
years before implementation. In the third analysis 
we considered both the announcement and the 
implementation and we compared purchasing in 
the year after implementation to the counterfactual 
estimated from purchasing in the two years before the 
announcement.
Primary analysis: category specific analyses
For each of the three analyses we developed separate 
controlled interrupted time series models for volume 
and sugar purchased from each levy liable and levy 
exempt drinks category and confectionery (fig 1). 
Supplementary material B provides the full model 
specification.
We present absolute and relative differences between 
observed purchasing and counterfactual scenarios in 
the final week of each observation period, with 95% 
confidence intervals for the relative difference obtained 
using the multivariate delta method.31
April 2014 April 2015 April 2016 April 2017 April 2018 April 2019
Announcement Implementation
Analysis 3: pre-post announcement and implementation (3 March 2014 - 24 March 2019; 107 pre-announcement and 51 post-implementation)
Analysis 2: pre-post implementation (21 March 2016 - 24 March 2019; 106 pre-implementation and 51 post-implementation)
Analysis 1: pre-post announcement (3 March 2014 - 25 March 2018; 107 pre-announcement and 106 post-announcement)
Fig 1 | Schematic of overall analysis strategy. Solid lines=observed data; dashed lines=counterfactual estimated from previous observed data
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Secondary analysis: all soft drinks categories 
combined, irrespective of levy eligibility
Levy exempt drinks include drinks that might contain 
comparable amounts of sugar to levy liable products. 
To examine the extent to which the SDIL impacted 
on the purchased volume of, and amount of sugar in, 
soft drinks, regardless of SDIL liability, we carried out 
controlled interrupted time series analysis, combining 
purchases of all soft drinks (irrespective of sugar 
content; ie, high tier, low tier, no levy, milk and milk 
based drinks, no added sugar fruit juice, and drinks 
sold as powders), levy liable drinks (irrespective 
of sugar content; ie, high tier, low tier, and no levy 
drinks), and according to sugar content based on levy 
tiers (irrespective of levy eligibility; ie, all soft drinks 
with ≥8 g of sugar per 100 mL, all soft drinks with ≥5 g 
to <8 g of sugar per 100 mL, and all soft drinks with 
<5 g of sugar per 100 mL).
Sensitivity analyses
Excluding small manufacturers—the SDIL exempts 
drinks from manufacturers and producers who sell 
less than one million litres of levy liable drinks 
annually. As we were unable to obtain a list of 
exempt manufacturers, our main analyses include all 
manufacturers. We conducted sensitivity analyses to 
examine the effect of excluding manufacturers who we 
estimated to be small. The total purchase volume was 
summed by manufacturer by year across the five years 
in the KWP dataset, and a mean purchase volume per 
year for each manufacturer was calculated. In the first 
sensitivity analysis, we excluded manufacturers with a 
mean of less than one million litres purchased per year. 
Acknowledging KWP data excludes purchases not 
brought home, we repeated these analyses excluding 
manufacturers with mean annual purchased volumes 
of <0.5 million litres in KWP. We were unable to 
access accurate estimates of the proportion of all 
drinks purchases brought home. This value reflects an 
arbitrary, but we think conservative, estimate of the 
minimum proportion of drinks brought home.
Interrupted time series without a control category—
Toiletries were chosen as a control condition a priori to 
account for background trends in household purchases. 
It is, however, possible that a more appropriate control 
exists. As we only have access to data on purchasing 
of the categories described here (confectionery, drinks, 
toiletries), we were not able to examine alternative 
potential control categories. To examine the effect of 
the decision to use toiletries as the control category, we 
performed an additional sensitivity analysis with no 
control condition.
Changes to protocol
We made several changes to the published protocol.28 
KWP provided additional data that allowed us to 
increase the precision of our estimates. Specifically, 
we were able to increase the pre-announcement study 
period from 104 to 107 weeks and reduce the unit of 
analysis from purchases every four weeks to purchases 
every week. We originally intended to include purchases 
not brought home. We excluded these purchases, 
however, as these data were not available before 
mid-2015, meaning that robust pre-announcement 
trends could not be estimated. Although we originally 
intended to combine all no levy drinks, we present 
these disaggregated into those with >0 g and <5 g of 
sugar per 100 mL, 0 g of sugar per 100 mL, and bottled 
water, as trends for these different categories are 
noticeably different. Our original intention to explore 
potential disparities across socioeconomic groups will 
be pursued in future work.
Patient and public involvement
The steering group for the wider SDIL evaluation 
includes two lay members and meets twice a year. 
Patients and the public were not involved in developing 
the research question, the outcome measures, the 
design, or the conduct of the work reported here. The 
steering group has regularly contributed ideas for 
routes to dissemination.
Results
About 31 million purchases of drinks, confectionery, 
and toiletries from March 2014 to March 2019 were 
included from a mean of 22 183 households each 
week. The characteristics of included households 
remained consistent over the study period, and after 
weighting they largely reflected households in 2014-
19 in the UK (see supplementary table 1).
Table 1 summarises the households’ weekly pur-
chased volumes of, and amounts of sugar in, drinks 
and other categories over the study period. Substantial 
reductions in volume of, and sugar in, purchases of 
SDIL liable drinks were observed in the high and low 
tiers over time. These reductions were accompanied 
by a smaller increase in volume of no levy drinks 
purchased, but proportionally much greater increases 
in sugar purchased in these drinks.
Primary analysis: category specific results
Results of the controlled interrupted time series 
analyses of purchased volume of, and sugar in, levy 
liable drinks and confectionery are shown in figure 2 
(volume) and figure 3 (sugar). Absolute and relative 
changes are summarised in table 2 and table 3. 
Supplementary tables 2a and b show level and trend 
changes from these models. Supplementary figures 1a 
and b show similar figures and data for subcategories 
of no levy drinks and exempt categories.
High tier drinks
The trend in purchased volume of, and sugar in, high 
tier drinks continued downwards throughout the study 
period. The implementation, but not announcement, of 
the SDIL was associated with a reduction in purchased 
volume of, and sugar in, these drinks. The volume 
of high tier drinks purchased was 139.0 mL (95% 
confidence interval 191.0 to 86.9 mL) per household 
per week, or 41.6% (95% confidence interval 53.7% 
to 29.5%), lower in March 2019 compared with the 
counterfactual estimated from pre-implementation 
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trends. Sugar purchased in these drinks decreased 
by 16.1 g (95% confidence interval 24.8 to 7.3 g) per 
household per week, or 43.1% (61.1% to 25.1%). 
Results compared with the counterfactual estimated 
from pre-announcement trends were similar.
Low tier drinks
Purchased volume of, and sugar in, low tier drinks 
gradually increased before the announcement of 
the SDIL. The announcement was associated with a 
reversal of this trend, but implementation was not 
associated with any additional statistically significant 
change. Compared with the counterfactual estimated 
from pre-announcement trends, in March 2019 the 
volume of purchased low tier drinks per household 
per week decreased by 177.3 mL (225.3 to 129.3 mL), 
or 85.9% (95.1% to 76.7%); and sugar purchased in 
these drinks decreased by 12.5 g (15.4 to 9.5 g) per 
household per week, or 86.2% (94.2% to 78.1%).
No levy drinks
Before the announcement of the SDIL there was a 
gradual upward trend in volume of purchased no levy 
drinks but a gradual downward trend in purchased 
sugar. Announcement of the SDIL was associated 
with a non-significant decrease in volume of no levy 
drinks purchased, whereas implementation was 
associated with a statistically significant increase in no 
levy drinks purchased. Overall, purchased volume of 
no levy drinks in March 2019 was 210.5 mL (−100.1 
to 521.2 mL), equivalent to 7.7% (−4.4% to 19.9%) 
higher compared with the counterfactual of pre-
announcement trends, although this did not reach 
statistical significance.
Increases were, however, found in sugar purchased 
from no levy drinks associated with the announcement, 
but not the implementation, of the SDIL. Compared 
with the counterfactual of pre-announcement trends, 
in March 2019 sugar purchased in no levy drinks 
increased by 15.3 g (12.6 to 17.9 g) per household per 
week, or 166.4% (94.2% to 238.5%).
Changes in purchased volume of subcategories 
within the no levy drinks group were not uniform. Both 
the announcement and the implementation of the SDIL 
were associated with significant decreases in bottled 
water purchased. In contrast, the implementation, but 
not announcement, of the SDIL was associated with 
increases in purchased drinks with no sugar and with 
>0 to <5 g total sugar per 100 mL.
Levy exempt drinks and confectionery
Overall, the announcement and implementation of the 
SDIL were associated with no statistically significant 
changes in purchased volume of levy exempt drinks 
or confectionery. An overall reduction was, however, 
found in sugar purchased from milk and milk based 
drinks. Compared with the counterfactual of pre-
announcement trends, in March 2019 sugar purchased 
in these drinks decreased by 11.9 g (23.1 to 0.8 g) per 
household per week, equivalent to 7.4% (13.8% to 
0.9%).
Secondary analysis: all soft drinks categories 
combined
Supplementary table 3a and supplementary figure 2 
summarise the results of the controlled interrupted 
time series analyses of the associated effects of the 
SDIL on purchased volume of, and sugar from, all 
soft drinks categories combined, irrespective of levy 
eligibility. Supplementary table 3b summarises abso-
lute and relative changes in volume of, and sugar in, all 
soft drinks and confectionery purchased.
Overall, compared with the counterfactual esti-
mated from pre-announcement trends, no change was 
Table 1 | Mean volume of, and amount of sugar in, purchased drinks and confectionery per household per week in relation to the UK soft drinks 
industry levy, March 2014 to March 2019













Levy liable drinks (sugar/100 mL)
High tier (≥8 g) 951 (150) 677 (159) 297 (70) 105.6 (16.5) 75.2 (17.3) 32.7 (7.9)
Low tier (≥5 g to <8 g 168 (40) 144 (43) 65 (28) 10.9 (2.7) 9.5 (2.8) 4.4 (1.9)
No levy (<5 g): 2517 (235) 2576 (298) 2935 (400) 12.5 (1.7) 12.4 (2.6) 21.5 (4.8)
 >0 g to <5 g 835 (87) 764 (99) 858 (133) 12.5 (1.7) 12.4 (2.6) 21.5 (4.8)
 0 g 1073 (116) 1097 (148) 1346 (200) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
 Bottled water 609 (78) 714 (90) 730 (124) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Levy exempt drinks
Alcoholic drinks 1959 (452) 1871 (516) 1806 (524) . . .
Milk and milk based 
drinks:
3705 (203) 3460 (224) 3358 (241) 180.3 (9.9) 167.9 (11.1) 160.9 (11.3)
 Milk 3573 (194) 3338 (216) 3237 (234) 167.5 (9.0) 156.5 (10.2) 150.3 (10.7)
 Milk based drinks 132 (14) 122 (16) 121 (11) 12.8 (1.4) 11.4 (1.6) 10.6 (1.0)
Fruit juices with no 
added sugar
534 (37) 493 (51) 497 (57) 52.7 (3.8) 47.8 (5.0) 47.4 (5.5)
Drinks sold as  
powders (g)
100 (13) 87 (11) 82 (12) 21.6 (3.4) 18.3 (3.2) 16.5 (3.0)
Confectionery (g) 325 (98) 301 (95) 287 (93) 182.5 (55.0) 169.0 (53.3) 161.0 (52.1)
Toiletries 125 (10) 119 (10) 118 (11) . . .
Sugar from alcoholic drinks is not included here as many alcoholic drinks contain sugar but the product label does not provide the amount.
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observed in volume of all soft drinks purchased in 
March 2019. A reduction was, however, found in sugar 
purchased in all soft drinks (including exempt drinks) 
combined of 29.5 g per household per week (55.8 to 
3.1 g), equivalent to 9.8% (17.9% to 1.8%).
Sensitivity analyses
Excluding manufacturers of levy liable products 
with less than one million and less than 500 000 
litres of purchased drinks annually in our dataset 
was associated with small changes in the magnitude 
of estimated coefficients, but with no change in the 
direction or statistical significance of any findings 
(supplementary tables 4a to b).
Removing the control category led to wider con-
fidence intervals in a small number of cases such that 
absolute and relative changes in volume were not 
statistically different from the pre-implementation 
counterfactuals (see supplementary material G).
Discussion
Taking account of pre-existing trends, this study 
found that one year after implementation of the SDIL, 
sugar purchased from soft drinks that were taken 
home decreased by 30 g per household per week. No 
evidence was found of a statistically significant change 
in purchased volume. Assuming a mean UK household 
size of 2.4 people,32 this is equivalent to a reduction 
in sugar consumption from SSBs of 12.5 g per person 
per week, or equivalent to the replacement of one 
250 mL serving of a drink with 5 g sugar per 100 mL 
per person per week with a sugar-free alternative. A 
modelling study conducted before implementation of 
the SDIL found that if the levy achieved reformulation 
it could be expected to lead to a decrease in sugar 
consumption from SSBs of 7-38 g per person per week 
and that this would be associated with a reduction in 
the number of obese individuals in the UK of 0.2-0.9% 
and a reduction in incidence cases of type 2 diabetes of 
0.8-4.4 per 1000 person years. The reduction in sugar 
from SSBs we report one year after implementation of 
the SDIL is within this range.
Strengths and weaknesses of this study
In this study we used a large, nationally representative 
dataset, included a control category, and explored 
changes in two potential substitute categories (alcohol 
and confectionery).
We only included purchases brought into homes. 
Although KWP also collects data on other purchases, 
this smaller panel was established in mid-2015 and 
so was unsuitable for our analyses because robust 
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Announcement Implementation Announcement Implementation
Modelled observed data: control (toiletries)
Modelled observed data: drink category or confectionery Pre-implementaion counterfactual
Pre-announcement counterfactual
Fig 2 | Observed and modelled volume of drinks liable to the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL), and weight of confectionery purchased by each 
household weekly, March 2014 to March 2019. Points are observed data; coloured lines are modelled data; the first vertical line indicates the 
announcement of the SDIL; the second vertical line indicates the implementation of the SDIL; the Y axis varies in scale between panels to maximise 
the resolution of figures; modelled purchases are presented as smoothed lines, including averaged effects for seasonality and the impact of 
Christmas and January, and, for confectionery, Easter
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pre-announcement trends could not be estimated. 
KWP data are collected at the household level and 
do not take account of waste or differential sharing 
within households. Nevertheless, the data provide 
a reasonable estimate of consumption.33 We did not 
assess changes in other categories beyond soft drinks, 
alcohol, and confectionery.
The estimate of effect size in interrupted time 
series analyses is based on a modelled counterfactual 
that might be inaccurate. For example, the strong 
downward trend in higher tier drinks before the 
announcement of the SDIL might not have continued. 
Attribution of effects in interrupted time series analyses 
is vulnerable to co-interventions. The SDIL is part of a 
wider sugar reduction strategy, although this has been 
found to have achieved minimal changes beyond those 
attributable to the SDIL.24
The personal characteristics of the panel remained 
similar over the study period, and proprietary 
weightings were used to account for non-consumers 
and to adjust for variations in panel composition. 
Households participating in KWP are slightly more 
likely to be from lower social position and to have 
no qualifications compared with UK households 
generally. This might reflect the relative value placed 
on the small rewards for participation by different 
households and could limit the generalisability of 
our findings. If households from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds are more likely to change purchasing as 
a result of the SDIL, then we could have marginally 
overestimated the effect of the SDIL. However, while 
we previously found that the price of soft drinks in the 
UK did change after implementation of the SDIL, no 
clear pattern was found, with the price of some groups 
of drinks increasing and others decreasing.16 We 
previously found no systematic differences between 
the sugar content of drinks reported in KWP data 
and contemporaneous values listed on supermarket 
websites.27
Comparison with other work
Our finding that the SDIL was associated with a 
reduction in purchased sugar from all soft drinks is 
consistent with previous analyses that focused on the 
SDIL.24 25 Although our estimate of the reduction in 
sugar consumption from all soft drinks associated with 
the levy (9.8%) was less than that estimated by others 
(29%), this previous work did not take account of pre-
existing trends.24
We found that the reduction in purchased sugar 
from all soft drinks occurred despite no change 
in volume of all soft drinks purchased. This is 
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Fig 3 | Observed and modelled amount of sugar in drinks liable to the Soft Drinks Industry Levy and confectionery purchased by each household 
weekly, March 2014 to March 2019. Points are observed data; coloured lines are modelled data; the first vertical line indicates the announcement of 
the SDIL; the second vertical line indicates the implementation of the SDIL; the Y axis varies in scale between panels to maximise the resolution of 
figures; modelled purchases are presented as smoothed lines, including averaged effects for seasonality and the impact of Christmas and January, 
and, for confectionery, Easter
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consistent with previously reported reductions in the 
sugar concentration of drinks associated with the 
SDIL.16 The estimated effect size is also within the 
range of reformulation scenarios modelled before 
implementation (ie, a reduction of 17 to 90 g of sugar 
per household per week).34
Evaluations of other SSB taxes have revealed a 
consistent trend of reductions in purchasing of taxed 
drinks and no change in purchasing of untaxed drinks.5 
We found similar, with both volume of, and sugar in, 
high and low tier drinks decreasing overall. These 
reductions in volume of taxed drinks were offset by 
increases in volume of other drinks purchased. Despite 
some increases in sugar purchased in some categories 
of untaxed drinks, these did not offset decreases in 
sugar purchased from taxed drinks.
Meaning of the study and implications for 
policymakers
Our main findings are that the SDIL was associated with 
a reduction in purchased sugar from all soft drinks with 
no evidence of a commensurate reduction in the volume 
of soft drinks purchased. Given the reformulation 
associated with the SDIL already documented,16 it is 
probable that the changes we report were driven by 
reductions in the sugar concentration of available 
drinks, alongside consumers switching to lower sugar 
alternatives. Despite the overall reduction we found in 
sugar purchased in soft drinks, the average amount of 
sugar purchased in drinks that are not subject to the 
levy paradoxically increased after implementation of 
the SDIL, with many drinks that previously had sugar 
concentrations above the levy threshold now having 
them just below the threshold. This seems to reflect 
manufacturers reformulating to target thresholds. 
Lowering the threshold sugar concentration at 
which drinks become eligible for the SDIL could 
potentially lead to greater overall reductions in sugar 
concentrations and sugar purchased in soft drinks, 
as could extension of the SDIL to milk based drinks 
and other currently exempt categories that sometimes 
contain high levels of sugar.
Nevertheless, the overall reduction in sugar with 
no change in volume we report here might represent 
a valuable benefit for public health with little harm to 
the food industry. The SDIL has also been found to have 
had no long term negative effects on the share value or 
turnover of UK soft drinks companies,35 36 suggesting 
that, contrary to industry predictions, public health 
can gain without negatively affecting the soft drinks 
sector.
We note a marked pre-implementation decline 
in purchasing of high levy tier drinks. It is possible 
that this was, at least in part, driven by concern from 
industry about a possible SSB tax, leading to some 
pre-announcement reformulation; alongside growing 
consumer awareness of, and concerns about, the 
health impacts of SSBs.37 Although it is uncertain if 
this trend would have continued in the absence of the 
SDIL, it is likely to be beneficial for health.
Reassuringly, we did not observe any change in 
purchasing of potentially harmful substitutes (ie, 
alcohol and confectionery) associated with the SDIL, 
which could have partially or wholly offset any public 
Table 2 | Absolute and relative change in volume of drinks (mL) and confectionery (g) purchased per household per week in relation to the UK soft 
drinks industry Levy, March 2014 to March 2019
Analysis 1: pre-post announcement  
(Mar 2014-Mar 2018)
Analysis 2: pre-post implementation  
(Mar 2016-Mar 2019)
Analysis 3: pre-post announcement and 
implementation (Mar 2014-Mar 2019)
Absolute  








change (mL or g)
Relative  
change (%)
Levy liable drinks (sugar/100 mL)


























































































































The counterfactual for low tier drinks crossed 0 mL shortly before the end of the study period thus predicting negative purchases; therefore the non-counterfactual estimate at the end of the 
study period was compared with the final week during which the counterfactual was a positive number.
*Significant difference at 95% confidence interval level.
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health gains from the SDIL. However, we did not study 
the SDIL’s effect on purchases of other food groups or 
on overall diet.
In contrast with previous findings from Mexico 
and Barbados,6 38 we did not observe an increase 
in purchased bottled water associated with the 
SDIL. Indeed purchases of bottled water decreased 
significantly during the study period. Although we 
cannot rule out an effect of the SDIL on bottled water 
purchases, we cannot think of a plausible pathway 
through which it achieved reductions in purchased 
bottled water. Instead, this reduction might be due 
to coincident increases in concern about single use 
plastic that have been attributed, in the UK, to the 
broadcast of the nature documentary series Blue Planet 
2 in October-December 2017.39 It is not clear if a similar 
“Blue Planet effect” has occurred in other countries. 
Unlike for many other soft drinks, a like-for-life 
substitution is available for bottled water in countries 
such as the UK—that is, filling reusable water bottles 
with tap water. Several UK retailers have reported 
substantial growth in sales of reusable water bottles 
since 2018.40 Given that tap water is freely available, it 
is difficult to study changes in its consumption directly.
Unanswered questions and future research
Future work should seek to understand the longer term 
effects of the SDIL on purchasing and consumption of 
soft drinks as well as total diet, and health outcomes. 
Differential effects of the SDIL on all these outcomes 
across population groups (eg, by socioeconomic 
position and in households with versus without 
children) should also be explored to determine 
whether the SDIL contributes to narrowing inequalities 
in health. The changes in purchasing we report here 
could be used as an input to health impact modelling 
to estimate the effect of changes on population 
prevalence of obesity, diabetes, and other chronic 
conditions. It is likely that the reformulation that has 
occurred in response to the SDIL16 reflects substantial 
increases in the use of artificial sweeteners in the UK 
soft drinks market. Given public mistrust of artificial 
sweeteners,37 the effect of the SDIL on consumption of 
these should also be explored.
Conclusion
One year after implementation of the SDIL, purchased 
sugar in soft drinks decreased by around 30 g per 
household per week without a change in the volume 
of purchased soft drinks. This tiered tax aiming to 
stimulate industry to remove sugar from soft drinks 
might represent a benefit for public health (by 
reducing sugar purchased from soft drinks without 
substitution to confectionery and alcohol) without any 
commensurate harm to the soft drinks industry (by not 
affecting total volume of soft drinks purchased).
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